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We  investigate  the  influence  of  founding-family  ownership  on  labor  relations  using 
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duration and the percentage of employees involved in major conflicts as well as the likelihood 
that  a  workplace  experiences  a  strike.  These  results  are  robust  to  different  definitions  of 
founding-family  ownership  and  control  for  endogeneity.  We  also  show  that  there  is  a 
significant  reduction  in  the  number  of  protected  employee  layoffs,  sanctioned  employees, 
individual law disputes handled by an employment tribunal, and the annual number of works 
council or union delegate meetings when a family member serves as the CEO of the firm. We 
document  the  impact  of  employee  ownership  and  representation  on  corporate  boards  of 
directors on labor relations and find a significant and negative relationship for dependent 
variables. Overall, these findings suggest that ownership structure is an important determinant 
of labor relations within firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Family-run businesses are a very common ownership structure in Western European 
countries (La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002)). Research on the role of family 
ownership in the modern corporation has often focused on firm value and performance (see 
for instance Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini (2006), Maury (2006), Villalonga and Amit 
(2006),  Miller  et  al.  (2007)).  It  is  argued  that  family  ownership  usually  offers  superior 
performance compared to other corporations. However, little is known about the relationship 
between this type of ownership and the quality of labor relations and, to our knowledge, such 
an empirical study on a firm-level basis has not been undertaken before and should therefore 
provide useful information about the behavior of family firms.  
Using a dataset covering the period 1973 to 1977, Tracy (1986) was one of the first to 
argue that besides industry characteristics and union density, firm-specific factors are key 
determinants of strike activity. The influence of other firm-level characteristics has also been 
previously  studied.  For  instance,  Cramton  et  al.  (2005)  observe  from  a  sample  of  U.S. 
bargaining data for the period 1970-1995 that Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
increase the efficiency of labor negotiation by reducing dispute rates. 
Good social relationships with employees are a form of non-pecuniary private benefits 
for corporate managers and owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and labor conflicts may 
harm  firm  profitability.  Several  arguments  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  family  ownership 
should improve the quality of labor relations within the firm such as paternalism (Mueller and 
Philippon,  2007),  a  more  long-term  oriented  strategy  (Sraer  and  Thesmar  (2007),  for 
instance), an emotionally attachment of family owners to their firm and employees and their 
will to transfer control of the firm to the next generations (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Poor 
labor relations would contradict these objectives. We investigate this link using workplace-
level  data  of  listed  companies  from  the  2004  Réponse  (RElations  PrOfessionnelles  et 
NégociationS d’Entreprise) survey conducted by the Dares (Direction de l’Animation de la 
Recherche, des Etudes et des Statistiques) which depends on the French Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs. This survey, which is derived from the data collected in the interviews 
with the most senior manager at the workplace, covers a wide range of issues dealing with 
employment  relationships  and  practices,  trade  union  representation,  dispute  and  grievance 
procedures  and  wages.  It  is  very  similar  to  the  Wers  (Workplace  Employment  Relations 
Survey)  survey  conducted  in  the  United  Kingdom.  From  a  dataset  consisting  of  1,002 
workplaces employing  more than 20 employees, our results provide  a contribution to the   - 2 -
existing  literature  by  showing  that  founding-family  ownership  significantly  reduces  the 
percentage of employees involved in the major labor conflict, its duration and the likelihood 
that a workplace experiences a strike. We also observe that when a founding-family member 
serves  as  CEO  of  the  firm,  there  is  a  significant  reduction  in  the  number  of  protected 
employee  layoffs  asked  by  the  management,  sanctioned  employees  and  individual  law 
disputes  between  employers  and  employees  handled  by  employment  tribunals,  the  annual 
number of works council and union delegate meetings in the workplace. Our results are robust 
to different definitions of founding-family ownership, several subsample analyses and the 
inclusion of several control variables such as unionization rates, whether the days of strikes 
are compensated, the type of employment contract and the presence of aggressive unions in 
the workplace. When we control for endogeneity as families may set up businesses with more 
favorable relations, we obtain highly similar results to the OLS regressions which indicate 
that our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns. 
We also document the impact of employee ownership and representation on corporate 
boards on labor relations as French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed 
companies be allowed to sit on the board (Ginglinger et al., 2009). In line with Cramton et al. 
(2005),  our  results  show  that  for  some  dependent  variables  employee  ownership  and 
representation improve the quality of labor relationships. Overall, our findings suggest that 
ownership structure is an important determinant of labor relations within firms. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  surveys  the 
literature on family ownership and labor relations and lays out our main testable hypothesis. 
Section  3  provides  some  institutional  background.  In  section  4,  we  describe  the  sample 
selection,  the  variables  we  use  in  our  tests  and  their  sources.  Section  5  reports  summary 
statistics. Section 6 presents the regression results and section 7 describes robustness checks. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Theory and testable hypothesis 
 
Family ownership is predominant in Western European countries and has received 
strong interest in the last decade in both finance and management literatures. La Porta et al. 
(1999) analyze the ownership structure of listed firms in 27 wealthy countries and find that 
the family-owned firm is common. Faccio and Lang (2002) document from a sample of 5,232 
corporations in 13 Western European countries that 44.29% of the firms are family controlled. 
Research on the role of family ownership in the modern corporation has focused on firm   - 3 -
value and performance with conflicting evidence. In Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini 
(2006),  Maury  (2006),  Villalonga  and  Amit  (2006),  Miller  et  al.  (2007),  valuation  and 
operating performance are found to be significantly higher in founder-controlled or managed 
corporations  while  Holderness  and  Sheehan  (1988),  Bertrand  and  Schoar  (2006)  or 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) contradict these results. However, to our knowledge, the link between 
family ownership and labor relations on a firm-level basis has not been undertaken before and 
thus appears as an open empirical issue. 
One of the main explanations for the presence of good social relationships in family 
firms is probably paternalism. Paternalism has traditionally governed family firms. Mueller 
and Philippon (2007) document that in the late 19
th century founding families established 
generous corporate welfare programs in response to severe industrial violence. Paternalism is 
seen as an “implicit contract” between the firm and its workers (Mueller and Philippon, 2007) 
where “the care and well-being of the employees and other stakeholders are emphasized” 
(Huse, 2007). One of the most common examples of paternalism in French companies is 
probably Schneider under the management of Eugène Schneider which became for a long 
time after its creation in 1836 involved in all facets of community life: housing, schooling, 
training, health and religion
1. Paternalism may have a positive impact on industrial relations 
in that it may lead to a stronger sense of loyalty and commitment from employees. Using 
country-level data from thirty countries, Mueller and Philippon (2007) show that family firms 
are  particularly  effective  at  coping  with  difficult  labor  relations  and  find  that  family 
ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are difficult. 
Several  arguments  which  ensue  from  paternalism  also  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
founding-family  owners  should  care  more  than  other  owners  about  improving  relations 
between employers and employees. Family firms pursue a more long-term oriented strategy 
than  non-family  firms  do  which  is  profitable  to  employees.  These  firms  provide  “patient 
capital” (see Block, 2008). Sraer and Thesmar (2007) show from firms listed on the French 
stock exchange between 1994 and 2000 that family companies pay wages that are lower by 
10% than those paid by widely-held firms because these firms hire younger and less skilled 
employees. Under implicit labor contracts, family firms promise that most workers will keep 
their jobs even if total sales decrease. In exchange of lower wages or harder work for the same 
wage, family firms provide employment insurance to their employees. Using a sample of 
firms  in  the  S&P  500  Index  from  1994  to  2003,  Block  (2008)  documents  that  family 
                                                 
1 See http://www.schneider-electric.fr.   - 4 -
ownership decreases the likelihood of deep job cuts (i.e. in excess of 6%). This could be 
explained by the fact that family owners are emotionally attached to their firm and employees, 
have a good understanding of the firm and the business and often want to transfer control of 
the firm to the next generations (see also Burkart et al. (2003), Bertrand and Schoar (2006)). 
Additionally, as firm name is seen to be a “carrier of a reputation, in both economic and 
political markets” (Burkart et al., 2003), poor labor relations would contradict this objective. 
Families and employees are more sensitive to firm specific risk (Sraer and Thesmar, 
2007),  founding  families  hold  less  diversified  portfolios  and  are  more  concerned  by  firm 
survival (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Families are therefore likely to minimize firm risk by for 
instance  undertaking  low  risk  investments,  having  lower  firm  leverage  and  costly  work 
disruptions. Moreover, large firms offer inferior working conditions (see for example Brown 
and Medoff (1989)). As shown in all empirical studies, family companies are smaller than 
non-family businesses so that one could argue that labor relations are better in family firms. 
  Family  members  often  serve  as  the  firm’s  CEO  (see  Anderson  and  Reeb  (2003), 
Barontini (2006), Maury (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Miller et al. (2007))
2. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) argue that the presence of family managers may align the firm’s interests 
with those of the family and that these managers may bring knowledge that outside ones do 
not have. They find that when family members serve as CEOs, performance is better than 
with outside CEOs. Villalonga and Amit (2006) and other numerous studies obtain similar 
findings  only  when  the  founder  serves  as  the  CEO.  Besides  the  previous  arguments 
suggesting that family ownership improves the quality of labor relations, we should observe 
the same outcome with family management. Labor relation studies have mainly focused on 
the link between managerial ownership, worker wages and restructuring measures. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that benefits from social relationships with employees are a form of 
non-pecuniary private benefits for corporate managers. Pagano and Volpin (2005) predict that 
managers  expecting hostile takeover threats may  intentionally provide  workers substantial 
above-market  wages  and  voting  rights  as  part  of  a  management-worker  alliance.  This  is 
empirically verified by  Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) who show that managers 
insulated from takeovers through U.S. state adoption of antitakeover laws pay their workers 
more reflecting thus their aspirations to enjoy the “quiet life” and by Cronqvist et al. (2009) 
who obtain the same result when Swedish CEOs have more control. Such managers also 
reduce  the  destruction  of  old  plants  and  the  creation  of  new  plants  (Bertrand  and 
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Mullainathan, 2003) as well as the occurrence of large-scale worker layoffs (Atanassov and 
Kim, 2009). However, even though family ownership decreases the likelihood of deep job 
cuts, Block (2008) does not find a significant impact of family management. We can therefore 
summarize the above arguments as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: A founding-family environment improves the quality of labor relations. 
 
3. Institutional background 
 
We  briefly  describe  in  this  section  the  French  institutional  background  of  labor 
relations.  Labor  relations  in  France  are  governed  by  labor  laws  (Code  du  travail)  and 




In France, the right to strike was recognized in the preamble to the Constitution of 
October 27, 1946. There is little state regulation of private sector strike activity in France. The 
right to strike is an individual right and not a union prerogative: strikes by a minority of 
employees (at least two) or without advance notice are lawful but must concern demands of 
professional order (employees who strike over pay or job cuts, for instance). The contract of 
employment of those who strike is considered suspended for the duration of the strike. Then, 
days of strike can be partially or fully paid: in practice, the payment of the days of strike often 
becomes a separate demand and a major element in the negotiations of end of strike. 
 
3.2. Works councils 
 
Works councils are compulsory in France since 1945 in companies with more than 50 
employees. They are replaced in companies with several workplaces by plant-level works 
councils and a firm-level central committee. These employee representation institutions are 
collegiate bodies composed of elected employee members for a period of two years, trade 
union representatives and the senior manager of the company who chairs the council. The 
works council is financed by a subsidy from the company  which amounts to at least 0.2 
percent of the gross wage bill. The company must also provide the works council with a place 
in which to meet, equipped with the material necessary for its satisfactory functioning. The   - 6 -
works council meets at least once a month when the firm employs more than 150 employees 
(once every two months otherwise). The council has information and consultation rights on 
working hours and conditions (for instance, introduction of new technologies, compensation, 
training  and  employment),  redundancies  for  economic  reasons  and  protected  employee 
layoffs. It has also to be kept informed about the economic and financial performance of the 
firm. Then, works councils are in charge of social and cultural activities (trips, Christmas 
parties…)
3 within the firm for the benefit of the employees, their families and the retirees of 
the company. 
 
3.3. Conseils de Prud’hommes 
 
Individual  private  sector  law  disputes  between  employers  and  employees  such  as 
unfair dismissals, redundancy payments, discriminations, claims relating to wages are handled 
in France by one of the 282 Conseils de Prud’hommes (“Conciliation boards”). Created in 
1806,  these  employment  tribunals  are  specialized  jurisdictions  composed  of  elected 
representatives from employer and trade union bodies in equal numbers. Appeal can be made 
to a Cour d’appel. 
 
3.4. Union delegates 
 
Union  delegates  appeared  in  French  companies  of  more  than  eleven  employees  in 
1936. They are elected for four years and represent their union and employees in dealings 
with the management of the firm. They have paid time off to perform their functions. Union 
delegates have several prerogatives. They have to present to the employer all individual and 
collective concerns and complaints about salaries, health, safety, respect of labor law. They 
also have to inform the Inspecteur du travail (“Work inspectorate”) of all non-respect of 
complaints and observations relative to the application of laws and regulations within the 
company and assist employees when they are dismissed. The employer has to meet with them 
at least once a month. 
 
3.5. Protected and sanctioned employees 
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Worker representation is a structuring principle of French labor law. It ensures specific 
protection of labor representatives (union delegates, members of the works council) as well as 
pregnant women. Special formalities apply for protected employee dismissals. If the employer 
wishes to terminate their contracts, permission has to be obtained from the works council and 
employment  authorities.  Employers  who  sanction  employees  following  a  fault  (absence 
without a proper justification, theft…) also have to follow a specific disciplinary procedure. 
 
4. Sample selection, variables and sources 
 
4.1. Sample selection 
 
Precise data on strikes as well as on wages and employment structure are difficult to 
obtain. We deal with this problem by using the 2004 Réponse (RElations PrOfessionnelles et 
NégociationS d’Entreprise) survey conducted by the Dares (Direction de l’Animation de la 
Recherche, des Etudes et des Statistiques) which depends on the French Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs
4. This survey provides reliable, nationally representative data on the state 
of labor relations in workplaces employing more than 20 employees and is very similar to the 
Wers (Workplace Employment Relations Survey) survey conducted in the United Kingdom. It 
is  derived  from  the  data  collected  in  the  interviews  with  the  most  senior  manager  at  the 
workplace. Questions cover a wide range of issues dealing with employment relationships and 
practices  such  as  for  instance  economic  context,  consultation,  communication,  work 
organization,  trade  union  representation,  dispute  and  grievance  procedures.  This  survey 
contains  a  large  number  of  variables  on  conflicts  and  includes  a  significant  number  of 
variables to characterize all aspects of each strike. The first two surveys were led in 1992 and 
1998.  We  use  the  third  one  led  in  2004  (economic  and  labor  environments  may  be 
determinants of strikes but the fact that our study covers only a year is not likely to be a 
difficulty as 2004 was not characterized by unusual economic or social activity). 
In this paper, we use both firm-level and plant-level data, but focus our comments on 
workplace-level outcomes. Plant-level data have been used in former researches, for instance 
in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). We start with the 2,930 workplaces available in the 
survey and select workplaces of subsidiaries which belong to listed parent companies with an 
ultimate ownership of more than 95%. A workplace is defined as a separate physical location. 
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We check the ultimate ownership information which is not displayed in the Dares survey 
(each workplace is assigned a unique and time-invariant registration number called Siren, 
Système  d’Identification  du  Répertoire  des  Entreprises)  from  several  sources  including 
registration  documents  and  annual  reports,  Diane  and  Dafsaliens  databases  which  report 
historical ultimate ownerships and LexisNexis and Factiva databases. In total, this selection 
procedure yields 1,002 workplaces belonging to 402 unique firms. 
 
4.2. Family ownership and management 
 
One  of  the  primary  concerns  was  the  determination  of  family  firms.  We  follow 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) who define a family firm as a 
“firm whose founder or a member of the family by either blood or marriage is an officer, a 
director, or the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity, individually or as a group”, where a 
founder is “an individual responsible for the firm’s early growth and development”. We use 
four measures of a founding-family firm (we define all the variables used in our paper in the 
Appendix): Family Ownership is the fraction of shares of all classes held by the founding 
family with at least a 5% equity stake. Family Firm is a binary variable that equals one when 
the founding family holds at least a 5% equity stake, and 0 otherwise. Largest Owner is a 
binary variable that equals one when the founding family is the largest shareholder in the 
firm, and zero otherwise. Then, Family Management is a binary variable that equals one 
when any member of the founding family holds the title of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), 
and zero otherwise. 
We manually extract data on family equity stake and management from registration 
documents (proxy statements in the case of American listed firms) available on the Autorité 
des  Marchés  Financiers  (AMF,  the  French  stock  exchange  regulator)  website  for  French 
listed companies, on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website for companies 
listed in the United States, on the Thomson One Banker database or on the Internet websites 
of individual companies. For the identification of founders, we use several sources such as 
registration  documents  or  annual  reports,  Factiva  and  LexisNexis  databases,  corporate 
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4.3. Other ownership and board variables 
 
We use two other ownership variables. 5% Ownership is the fraction of shares of all 
classes  held  by  all  the  non-family  shareholders  who  hold  at  least  a  5%  equity  stake. 
Employee Ownership is the fraction of shares of all classes held by the employees. We also 
use the fraction of directors on the board elected by the employees (Employee Directors). 
We use the same data sources as mentioned above. 
In  their  model,  Pagano  and  Volpin  (2005)  demonstrate  that  the  average  employee 
compensation (or the fraction of long-term contracts) is predicted to correlate negatively with 
the controlling shareholder’s equity stake in companies that are not takeover targets, other 
factors  being  equal.  In  companies  where  the  controlling  party’s  equity  stake  is  high, 
employees should earn relatively low wages and be strictly monitored. Mueller and Philippon 
(2006)  argue  that  countries  with  hostile  relations  have  significantly  more  concentrated 
ownership than countries with cooperative relations. Thus, the presence of large non-family 
blockholders  should  amplify  labor  conflicts  within  the  firm.  Cramton  et  al.  (2008) 
demonstrate that Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) create incentives for unions to 
become weaker bargainers and lead to a reduction in the fraction of labor disputes that involve 
a  strike.  Employee  ownership  should  therefore  improve  labor  relations.  Ginglinger  et  al. 
(2009) distinguish two types of employee directors in France: employee directors elected by 
right and directors elected by employee-shareholders. In our sample, only a few firms have 
directors elected by employee-shareholders so we only take into account employee directors 
elected by right. As presented in Gorton and Schmid (2004), Fauver and Fuerst (2006) or 
Ginglinger  et  al.  (2009),  employee  board  representation  should  improve  the  quality  of 
industrial relations. 
 
4.4. Labor relation variables 
 
We use in our paper several measures of the quality of labor relations. We first focus 
on  strike  activity.  A  strike  has  a  number  of  dimensions  such  as  the  number  of  workers 
involved, the duration, the loss of sales. We decide to study the impact of founding-family 
ownership and management on two of them as all are not available in the database due to the 
difficulty of measure. We use the percentage of workplace employees involved during the 
climax of the main strike which occurred in 2004 (Involvement) and the logarithm of the 
duration in hours of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace (Duration). We also   - 10 -
use a binary variable that takes the value of one it the workplaces experienced a strike, and 
zero otherwise (Strike). For these variables, we control for the motive for the strike with 
dummy variables, whether the strike is due to redundancies, working hours, compensation, 
labor  relations  in  the  plant,  union  law,  working  conditions,  qualifications  or  internal 
organization and whether the strikers received full or part compensation during their days of 
strike (Compensated). Compensated days of strike should be logically positively correlated 
to our labor conflict measures. 
We also use five additional labor relation variables. First, we use the ratios of the 
number of plant protected employee layoffs asked by the management (Protected Employee 
Layoffs), sanctioned employees (Sanctioned Employees) and individual labor law disputes 
handled  by  an  employment  tribunal  (Individual  Law  Disputes)  during  the  year  to  the 
average number of employees in the workplace. Second, we use the annual number of works 
council (Works Council Meetings) and union delegate (Union Delegate Meetings) meetings 
in the workplace. 
 
4.5. Control variables 
 
Firm-level data come from Worldscope. As our sample comprises both French and 
foreign firms, we recalculate all amounts in euros using end-of  year exchange rates from 
Datastream. Financial data come from the fiscal year-end closest to end of 2004. We use the 
logarithm of the book value of total assets to measure Firm Size. Smaller firms are more 
likely to have more consensual labor relations (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Firm Leverage is 
computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Bronars and Deere (1991) argue that firms 
use  debt  to  protect  the wealth  of  shareholders  from  the  threat  of  unionization  due  to  the 
increased risk of bankruptcy. Based on all Compustat firms between 1953 and 1992 with at 
least 100 employees, Hanka (1998) finds that firms with higher debt reduce their employment 
more often, use more part time and seasonal employees and pay lower wages. Higher leverage 
should  therefore  be  associated  with  a  decline  in  the  importance  of  labor  conflicts.  Firm 
investment  policy,  profitability,  past  growth,  growth  opportunities  and  valuation  are 
respectively  measured  by  the  ratio  of  capital  expenditures  to  total  assets  (Capital 
Expenditures),  Return  on  Assets  defined  as  operating  income  over  total  assets,  Sales 
Growth computed as percentage change in net sales between 2003 and 2004, and Market-to-
Book defined as the ratio of the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the 
book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. Employees should   - 11 -
be  more  conflict-inclined  when  investment  levels,  profitability,  valuation  and  growth 
opportunities  are  high.  DeAngelo  and  DeAngelo  (1991)  show  that  when  profitability 
increases, the firm’s bargaining position relative to a union may be weakened. We also use 
the monthly stock return volatility over the last twelve months (Volatility) and control for the 
legal origin of the firm: Common Law Origin is a binary variable that equals one when the 
origin of the commercial law of a country where the firm is located is English Common Law, 
and zero otherwise. This data is extracted from A. Shleifer’s website. As developed in Allen 
and Gale (2002), firms of Anglo-Saxon countries pursue the interests of shareholders while 
firms  of  other  countries  such  as  for  instance  Japan,  Germany  and  France  are  more 
stakeholder-oriented toward their employees, customers and shareholders. We may assume 
that Common Law countries are less conflict-inclined as firms may be less sensitive to labor’s 
voice. 
As workplace-level control variables, we use the average number of employees in the 
plant (Plant Employees), the fraction of fixed-term workers and a binary variable that equals 
one when temporary workers are employed in the workplace (Temporary Workers). The 
number  of  workplace  employees  should  increase  the  intensity  and  the  duration  of  strikes 
while  fixed-term  and  temporary  workers  should  be  negatively  correlated  with  our  labor 
conflict variables due to their status. We also use binary variables to control for the presence 
in  the  workplace  of  executives,  commercials,  technicians,  employees  and  workers  and 
continuous variables to control for the workforce age structure. We expect younger workers to 
be less associated with labor conflicts. As for instance in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), 
we  use  the  net  average  hourly  full-time-equivalent  compensation  (Wage).  As  argued  in 
Cronqvist et al. (2009), higher wages can make labor relationships more pleasant and may 
result in more loyalty. Wage is therefore expected to be negatively associated with our labor 
conflict variables. In addition to this, we control for the age of the workplace (Age – we 
hypothesize that younger workplaces are more likely to be less conflict-inclined due to the 
fact that they may have weaker performance which is supposed to affect their survival), the 
Unemployment Rate in the area where the workplace is located (unemployment rate in the 
area  should  negatively  impact  strike  involvement  and  duration  as  workers  may  fear 
redundancies in high unemployment areas – this data is collected from the INSEE website, 
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques or National Institute of Statistics 
and Economic Studies)  and industry variables.  We also include in our regressions Union 
Membership.  Unions  make  wages  sticky  and  layoffs  costly  which  decreases  operating   - 12 -
flexibility and thus increases cost of equity (Chen et al., 2009). As a result, we expect unions 
to have a positive impact on the magnitude and the duration of conflicts. 
 
5. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of workplaces across the most common 
industries. Extractive and manufacturing industries account for the largest fraction (42.81%) 
of all observations while health services account for the smallest (0.90%). Real estate, rent 
and  business  services  represent  18.66%  of  all  observations,  wholesale  trade,  general 
merchandise  and  food  stores  represent  16.97%  of  the  sample.  Then,  financial  activities, 
construction, transportation and communications, social and personal services and hotels and 
restaurants account for 5.79%, 5.39%, 4.19%, 2.30%, 1.60% and 1.40% of all observations 
respectively. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of workplaces across the country of 
incorporation of the parent company. Controlling firms of the workplaces of our sample are 
incorporated in 21 different countries. More than 60% of our observations are workplaces of 
French  listed  companies.  13.17%,  4.99%,  4.29%  and  2.99%  of  the  observations  are 
workplaces of firms incorporated in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and the 
Netherlands respectively. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
Table  2  provides  descriptive  statistics  (number  of  observations,  mean,  median, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation) on ownership, board, firm, workplace-level and 
labor relation variables for our sample. As mentioned above, our sample consists of 1,002 
workplaces of 402 unique firms. 30% of the observations are workplaces of founding-family 
firms, while 34.33% of unique firms are founding-family companies. These percentages are in 
accordance with other previous studies: for instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that 35% 
of the S&P 500 firms are family-controlled and Villalonga and Amit (2006) document that 
family firms represent 37% of their sample. However, due to the fact that 38.81% of our 
unique firms are French, these percentages are probably lower than the number of founder-
controlled firms on the French stock market. The founding family is the largest owner of the 
firm  and  the  CEO  belongs  to  the  founding  family  in  27%  and  13%  of  the  workplaces, 
respectively. The mean founding-family equity stake in workplaces is 10.67%. On average, 
workplaces in our sample account for 3.85% of firm total employees. The average workplace 
in the sample employs 759 employees with a fraction of fixed-term employees of 3.85%. 62% 
of the workplaces in our sample employ temporary workers. The average hourly rate  for   - 13 -
workers is €14.32. 20% of the workplaces belong to a firm with a Common Law origin while 
the mean age of the workplaces in our sample is more than ten years. The unemployment rate 
in  the  area  where  the  workplace  is  located  is  8.96%.  Around  10%  of  the  employees  are 
affiliated to a union and 35.2% of the employees are under 35. The average firm in the sample 
has a book value of total assets of €54.1 billion. The mean fraction of shares held by all the 
non-family  shareholders  with  at  least  a  5%  ownership  is  20.14%,  the  mean  employee 
ownership is 2.24% and 4.74% of the directors on the corporate boards are elected by the 
employees. On average, 57% of the workplaces experienced a strike in 2004 with a mean 
involvement of employees of 16.83% during the climax of the main strike. The mean strike 
duration of the main conflict is 48.39 hours. On average, in the sample of workplaces, one 
protected employee was laid off in 2004, 9 were sanctioned and there were 5 individual law 
disputes handled by an employment tribunal. Union delegates met 10 times and there were 13 
works council meetings. 
We also present in Table 2 tests of differences in means (Student test) and medians 
(Wilcoxon  test)  between  workplaces  of  family  and  non-family  firms.  Workplaces  of 
founding-family firms tend to have significantly less employee ownership (average 1.53% 
compared to 2.54%) and representation on corporate boards (average 2.92% versus 5.51%) 
than  non-family  firms.  These  two  results  are  in  compliance  with  Trébucq  (2004)  and 
Ginglinger  et  al.  (2009)  findings.  The  fraction  of  shares  held  by  all  the  non-family 
shareholders with at least a 5% equity stake is non-surprisingly weaker in founding-family 
firms.  On  average,  founding-family  firms  are  significantly  smaller  (average  €13.1  billion 
compared to €71.6 billion, median €3.1 billion compared to €16.5 billion), exhibit higher 
growth rate,  growth opportunities and profitability but lower leverage  (even though these 
differences are not significant) and spend significantly more on capital investment. These 
firms exhibit significant higher levels of volatility (mean 0.07, median 0.053, versus 0.06 and 
0.052). Founding-family firms are also less frequently located in Common Law countries. 
When looking at workplace-level characteristics, we note that plant size measured by 
the  number  of  employees  is  smaller  for  family  firms  (average  497  compared  to  871 
employees, median 275 compared to 320 employees). Sraer and Thesmar (2006) suggest that 
French family  firms pay  lower wages mostly  because they have  younger and less skilled 
workers.  Carrasco-Hernandez  and  Sánchez-Marín  (2007)  obtain  the  same  result  from  a 
sample of 554 Spanish firms. Our results are consistent with their findings as we observe that 
the proportion of workers under 35 is significantly higher in workplaces of founding-family 
firms while wages are weaker (the difference is significant with the Wilcoxon test with a   - 14 -
median  hourly  wage  of  10.78  versus  13.15)  and  these  firms  employ  significantly  fewer 
executives  and  technicians.  Moreover,  founding-family  firms  employ  significantly  more 
fixed-term workers (5.28% versus 3.23%) but less temporary workers (60% of family firms 
versus 68% of non-family  firms), and are significantly less unionized (we have the same 
result as Mueller and Philippon (2007) who show that family firms have a lower percentage 
of unionized workers than widely held firms). 
Three of our labor disputes variables are significantly weaker in plants of founding-
family firms: the percentage of workers involved during the climax of the major conflict with 
an average (median) involvement of 12.09% (0.00%) versus 18.88% (5.00%), the logarithm 
of the duration of the major conflict which occurred in 2004 (average value of 1.52 versus 
1.88) and the binary variable that takes the value of one if the workplace experiences a strike, 
and zero otherwise (average of 0.49 versus 0.60). Average and median of the ratio of the 
number of sanctioned employees to the average number of employees are statistically higher 
in workplaces of founding-family firms. We do not have significant differences for our four 
other  labor  relation  variables:  the  ratios  of  the  number  of  workplace  protected  employee 
layoffs and individual law disputes handled by an employment tribunal (the Wilcoxon test is 
statistically significant) to the average number of employees, the annual number of works 
council and union delegate meetings in the workplace. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
 
6. Family ownership and labor relations: methodology and regression results 
 
6.1. Family ownership and strike involvement and duration 
 
We now focus on the relation between founding-family ownership and management 
and labor relations. Our multivariate analysis consists of a series of regressions. We estimate 
the following model: 
 
Labor Relation Variable = α + ß1(Founding-Family Ownership) + ß2(5% Ownership) + 
ß3(Employee Ownership) + ß4(Employee Directors) + ß1-31(Workplace-Level Characteristics) 
+ ß1-7(Firm Level Characteristics) + ß1-9(Conflict Characteristics) + ε 
 
Our estimate of the effect of founding-family ownership is ß1.We employ four types of 
cross-sectional  regressions:  ordinary  least  squares,  Tobit  (when  the  dependent  variable  is   - 15 -
censored), Probit (when the dependent variable is a dummy variable) and Poisson (when the 
dependent variable is discrete) regressions. For each of our regressions, we report the number 
of observations, the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared or the Pseudo R-squared in case of 
Probit regressions. Our tables present the coefficients and t-statistics and indicate coefficient 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the White (1980) test. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating the impact of founding-family ownership 
and management on the percentage of employees involved during the climax of the major 
conflict which occurred in the workplace in 2004. We report several regressions to show that 
the  impact  of  founding-family  ownership  and  management  on  our  dependent  variable  is 
robust  to  the  inclusion  of  firm-level  and  workplace-specific  controls  but  we  focus  our 
comments on the last four columns. Consistent with our expectations and hypothesis, our 
three measures of family ownership (Miller et al. (2007) show that findings are sensitive to 
the  way  in  which  family  business  is  measured  and  defined)  and  our  measure  of  family 
management are significantly negatively related to strike involvement (at the 10% level for 
the Family Management variable, at the 5% level for the  Family Ownership and  Largest 
Owner variables, and at the 1% level for the Family Firm variable), suggesting that a family 
ownership environment improves the quality of labor relations within workplaces. In line with 
the theoretical predictions of Pagano and Volpin (2005) and the empirical results of Mueller 
and Philippon (2006), the coefficient on the fraction of shares held by all the non-family 
shareholders  with  at  least  a  5%  ownership  (5%  Ownership)  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant. This result means that when the non-family controlling party’s equity stake is 
high,  employees  may  be  more  strictly  monitored  which  increases  the  intensity  of  labor 
conflicts. Consistent with our expectations, our strike incidence variable is significantly and 
negatively  correlated  to  the  fraction  of  employee  directors  elected  by  right  (Employee 
Directors), net average hourly compensation (Wage), and Common Law Origin (except for 
the  Family  Ownership  variable).  On  the  other  hand,  strike  involvement  is  significantly 
positively related to the Compensated binary variable that takes the value of one when the 
strikers received full or part compensation during their days of strike and zero otherwise, the 
number of plant employees and Union Membership. We now consider the impact of the firm-
specific  variables.  In  accordance  with  DeAngelo  and  DeAngelo  (1991)  results,  strike 
involvement  improves  with  profitability  (Return  on  Assets)  and  growth  (Sales  Growth) 
measures suggesting that employees are more likely to get involved in labor strikes when firm 
performance is high (however, we do not have a significant relationship with the Market-to-  - 16 -
Book). Surprisingly, in contrast with Bronars and Deere (1991) who predict that leverage 
reduces the impact of collective bargaining, firm leverage is not significantly related to strike 
involvement.  This  is  also  the  case  with  employee  ownership:  previous  studies  show  that 
moderate levels of employee ownership improve firm productivity and performance (Faleye 
et al. (2006), Kim and Ouimet (2007), Ginglinger et al. (2009)) but this ownership doesn’t 
seem to impact significantly the intensity of labor conflicts contrary to Cramton et al. (2005) 
predictions. Then, the last four columns of Table 3 show that the adjusted R-squared is 0.17 
which means that our model explains a substantial fraction of the cross-sectional variation in 
our labor relation measure. 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
In Table 4, we report the outcome of an alternative regression in which the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the duration in hours of the major conflict which occurred in the 
workplace (Duration). We focus our comments on the last four columns of the table. We 
obtain similar results to those presented in Table 3. Results confirm that when controlling for 
workplace-level  and  firm-level  as  well  as  conflict  characteristics,  the  coefficients  on  our 
family ownership and management variables are negative and statistically significant. These 
results suggest that family corporations tend to have better practices toward their employees 
that result in a reduction in strike duration. Other ownership and board variables such as 
employee  ownership  and  representation  on  corporate  boards  of  directors  (except  for  the 
Family  Ownership  variable)  as  well  as  the  fraction  of  shares  held  by  all  the  non-family 
stockholders with at least a 5% ownership (except for the Family Ownership and Family 
Management variables) do not exert a significant impact on strike duration. Results of our 
multivariate  analysis  confirm  that  strike  duration  increases  with  the  number  of  plant 
employees, when the days of strike are compensated, union membership, firm profitability 
(Return on Assets, except for the Family Firm and Largest Owner variables) and growth. 
Common  Law  origin  significantly  negatively  impacts  strike  duration.  Surprisingly,  Wage 
which had in Table 3 a negative and significant impact on strike involvement does not impact 
strike duration. Adjusted R-squared are a little bit stronger than those of Table 3, at least 0.21 
in the last four columns of Table 4. 
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
Then, Table 5 shows that a family ownership environment decreases the likelihood 
that a workplace experiences a strike. Some of the control variables are also significantly 
associated with the likelihood of a strike (the fraction of shares held by all the non-family 
shareholders with at least a 5% ownership, the number of employees in the workplace and   - 17 -
union membership) while the likelihood decreases with the fraction of employee directors on 
corporate  boards,  wage  and  Common  Law  origin  (except  in  the  case  of  the  Family 
Management variable). 
***Insert Table 5 about here*** 
Overall, our results suggest that founding-family ownership improves the quality of 
labor relations within workplaces by reducing strike involvement and duration as well as the 
likelihood that a workplace experiences a strike. 
 
6.2. Family ownership and alternative labor relation measures 
 
In  Table  6,  we  report  evidence  on  the  effects  of  founding-family  ownership  and 
management on additional labor relation measures. Columns 2 and 3 present the results of 
estimating  the  impact  of  founding-family  ownership  and  management  on  the  ratio  of  the 
number of employee layoffs asked by the management to the average number of employees in 
the  workplace  (Protected  Employees).  We  find  that  both  founding-family  ownership  and 
management significantly reduce the number of protected employee layoffs. This result may 
be due to the fact that family firms have better relations with their employees, conflicts may 
be resolved before using the threat of dismissal. We observe a significant and negative impact 
of the fraction of shares held by all the non-family shareholders with at least a 5% equity 
stake  and  employee  ownership.  We  may  hypothesize  that  large  shareholders  and  family 
owners try to avoid long and costly layoffs while employee ownership is associated with 
better practices from the employees. Other variables suggest that high-growth firms tend to 
have more protected employee layoffs which may be explained by the fact that employees 
seek to reject by all means new practices associated with growth, while firm profitability and 
leverage as well as the number of the workplace employees significantly decrease the ratio. 
Columns  4  and  5  present,  furthermore,  the  significant  and  negative  influence  of 
founding-family  management  on  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  sanctioned  employees  to  the 
average number of workplace employees (Sanctioned Employees) while columns 6 and 7 
report  the  results  on  the  number  of  individual  law  disputes  handled  by  an  employment 
tribunal (Individual  Law Disputes). Several findings are noteworthy.  Large workplaces in 
term of employees have significantly less conflicts probably because such conflicts are costly. 
There  are  less  sanctioned  employees  in  strongly  unionized  and  high  growth  workplaces 
maybe  because  management  wants  to  reduce  conflicts  in  periods  of  development.  Then,   - 18 -
employee ownership significantly reduces the number of disputes handled by an employment 
tribunal. 
Columns 8 and 9 present the results of regressing the annual number of union delegate 
meetings in the workplace (Employee Representatives Meetings) and columns 10 and 11 the 
results of estimating the number of works council meetings (Works Council). Freeman and 
Lazear  (1995)  argue  that  works  council  meetings  may  improve  communication  between 
workers and management where workers provide more accurate information to employers 
about  their  preferences,  and  thus  create  more  cooperative  labor  relations.  However, 
Ginglinger  et  al.  (2009)  suggest,  focusing  on  the  impact  of  employee  directors  on  board 
meeting frequency, that meetings may be costly in terms of time and organization. We find 
that family managed firms have a significant and negative impact on these two measures 
suggesting that labor relationships in family firms are more consensual and partners therefore 
reach an agreement more quickly. Similar to the empirical findings of Cramton et al. (2005) 
who demonstrate that ESOPs create incentives for unions to become weaker bargainers, we 
observe  that  employee  ownership  is  significantly  negatively  associated  with  employee 
representatives and works council meetings. Many of the other findings are intuitive. For 
instance, larger workplaces in term of employees imply more frequent meetings as well as 
poor profitable or highly leveraged firms in the case of employee representative meetings as 
employees have  an information right on the economic and financial performances. Union 
delegates of higher growth firms need to meet more frequently maybe because growth stands 
for  employees  organizational  changes  which  have  to  be  explained  with  managers.  Non-
surprisingly  higher  unionization  rate  in  workplace  implies  more  works  council  meetings. 
Other variables do not exert a significant impact on meeting frequency. 
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
Taken together, our results indicate that industrial relations in family businesses are 
more consensual than in their counterparts. 
 




Models explaining strike involvement and duration in Tables 3 and 4 are estimated on 
the implicit assumption that family ownership is exogenous. However, family ownership may 
be affected by the quality of labor relations as families may set up only firms in businesses   - 19 -
with good labor relations. As previously mentioned, family firms differ from other companies 
as they experience higher market value, profitability and growth, invest more, are less often 
located in a Common Law country and are younger. Endogeneity issues may affect the sign 
and/or  the  statistical  significance  of  our  results:  we  thus  must  check  our  results  for 
endogeneity by employing two-stage least-squares regressions. The first stage computes a 
predicted  level  of  family  ownership  based  on  firm  characteristics.  We  model  family 
ownership using the logarithm of Firm Size, Return on Assets, Sales Growth and Market-to-
Book as measures of firm profitability, past growth and growth opportunities measures. We 
also use Firm Leverage, the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (Capital Expenditures), 
the Common Law Origin binary variable and industry dummies. In order to meet the order 
condition of identifiability, we include one variable in our first stage regression namely the 
monthly  stock  return  volatility  over  the  last  twelve  months  (Volatility).  This  selection  of 
variables follows Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Maury (2006) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) who model ownership structures as a function of firm size and 
risk. The second stage then uses the predicted value from the first stage to instrument the 
endogenous choice variable in tests of labor relations. 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating the fraction of family ownership via a Tobit 
regression as the dependent variable is truncated at zero. Family ownership is likely to be 
smaller  when  firm  size  is  important.  High  rates  of  sales  growth,  low  volatility  and  the 
company  being  in  a  non-Common  Law  country  are  the  other  determinants  of  family 
ownership. Return on Assets and Market-to-Book ratios do not impact in our regression the 
fraction of family ownership. 
***Insert Table 7 about here*** 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 present the results of estimating the impact of family 
ownership on strike involvement and duration controlling for endogeneity. The results support 
the robustness of our previous findings as they are generally similar to our original unadjusted 
findings. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that family ownership improves the quality of 
labor  relations  by  reducing  both  strike  involvement  and  duration.  Concerning  the  control 
variables, all of them keep approximately the same significance with the two-stage least-
squares regressions. We keep similar adjusted R-squared to those of our previous regressions. 
***Insert Table 8 about here*** 
 
7.2. Country and industry issues 
   - 20 -
As mentioned before, our sample of observations contains workplaces of French and 
foreign companies. In Panel A of Table 9, we report results of the same regressions of those 
of Tables 3 and 4 after excluding first non French firms and second all French firms. We note 
that the effect of family ownership on strike involvement and duration remains significantly 
negative when we exclude all non French firms but disappears when we only focus on the 
foreign firms. Our sample also includes workplaces of financial firms even though valuation 
and profitability data of these firms may not be comparable to those of non-financial firms. 
Panel A of Table 9 shows that when we drop these workplaces, our results are virtually 
unchanged. Furthermore, if we cap the dependent variables at the 99
th percentile to reduce the 
weight of extreme values or if we exclude all workplaces without a strike during the year, we 
obtain similar results (see Panel A of Table 9). 
 
7.3. Controlling for restructuring measures and alternative control variables 
 
We consider two restructuring measures: large scale employee layoffs and major asset 
sales. Employees may seek to block them which could influence our results with extreme 
labor conflicts. By excluding firms with restructuring measures, we thus focus on firms with 
normal operational activity. We follow Atanassov and Kim (2008) methodology and exclude 
firms with decreases in the number of employees greater than 20% between 2003 and 2004 
and firms with a drop in net property, plant and equipment greater than 15% over the same 
period. Our results are robust to these restrictions, even when we exclude firms with negative 
Return on Assets as one could argue that employees in firms with negative profitability are 
less conflict-inclined (see Panel A of Table 9). 
Panel A of Table 9 then reports results of regressions when we use more restrictive 
definitions of family ownership such as family ownership defined as the fraction of shares of 
all classes held by the founding family with at least a 10% (or 20%) equity stake, family 
ownership when the founding family is the largest shareholder of the firm and has at least 
10% (or 20%) of the shares, and the fraction of votes held by the founding family. For all 
these definitions, we obtain similar results. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) as well as Miller et al. (2007) show that the relationship 
between  firm  performance  and  founding-family  ownership  is  non-linear.  McConnel  and 
Servaes  (1990)  or  Himmelberg  et  al.  (1999)  also  document  non-linearity  of  managerial 
holdings. We thus modify our regressions by including family ownership and the square of   - 21 -
family ownership as continuous variables. Unfortunately, we do not obtain a significant non-
linear relationship. 
  Founders  and  descendants  have  different  impacts  on  firm  value  and  performance 
(Anderson and Reeb (2003) or Villalonga and Amit (2006), for example). Panel B of Table 9 
reports results of regressions with the effects of family firm generations on the quality of 
labor relations. We show that the negative effect of a family ownership environment on strike 
involvement and duration is entirely attributable to second or later-generation family firms. 
***Insert Table 9 about here*** 
We check the sensitivity of our results using alternative control variables. For instance, 
when firm size is alternatively defined as the logarithm of net sales or market capitalization or 
total employees rather than the logarithm of total assets, the statistical significance of our 
dependent variables remains unchanged. Our results are qualitatively similar when we use 
different specifications of firm profitability (using Return on Equity measured as net income 
divided by common equity), leverage (using ratios based on the book or market values of 
equity), growth (using the change in total employees between 2003 and 2004) and valuation 
(using Tobin’s Q defined as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the 
book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets). 
Then, when we repeat our tests using a binary variable that equals one when the firm is 
registered in France or country dummies instead of the Common Law Origin binary variable, 
results remain unchanged (tables available upon request). 
 
7.4. Labor-friendly corporate practices 
 
We study the impact of labor-friendly corporate practices on our dependent variables 
using in our regressions a binary variable Best Company equals to one when the firm is in the 
list of one of the 2004 “Best companies to work for” classifications conducted either by the 
Financial  Times  (“The  World’s  Most  Respected  Companies”),  Great  Place  to  Work  For 
Institute, Journal du Net or TNS Sofres, and zero otherwise. Faleye and Trahan (2006) focus 
on firms selected by Fortune magazine as the 100 Best companies to work for in America 
between 1998 and 2004 and find that investors react positively to the list’s announcement. 
Our  variable  is  significantly  negative  in  the  regressions  of  the  number  of  plant  protected 
employee  layoffs  asked  by  the  management,  sanctioned  employees  and  individual  law 
disputes handled by an employment tribunal (tables available upon request).   - 22 -
We also include in the regressions the number of inhabitants in the city where the 
workplace is located (Population). We argue that employers in small towns may try to avoid 
strikes which could affect their reputations and employees may be less likely to strike in small 
towns due to a reputational effect. This variable is insignificant in the regressions (tables 
available upon request). 
 
7.5. Union aggressiveness 
 
As  in  Cronqvist  et  al.  (2008)  or  Ginglinger  et  al.  (2009),  we  introduce  in  all  our 
regressions  a  binary  variable  (Aggressive  Union)  that  equals  one  when  the  most 
representative confederation at the latest employee representatives election was affiliated to 
one of the communist or socialist-syndicalist confederations for which the 1906 Charter of 
Amiens  is  still  the  founding  document  even  though  some  confederations  reject  the 
revolutionary  aspect,  and  zero  otherwise.  More  accurately,  we  include  the  following 
confederations:  CGT  (Confédération  Générale  du  Travail  –  General  Confederation  of 
Labour),  FO  (Force  Ouvrière  –  Worker  Force),  UNSA  (Union  Nationale  des  Syndicats 
Autonomes – National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions) and Union Syndicale Solidaires  
(Syndicalist Union in Solidarity) which regroups different SUD unions (Solidaires Unitaires 
Démocratiques  –  Solidarian,  United,  Democratic).  We  observe  a  significant  and  positive 
impact of aggressive unions only in the case of plant employees involved during the climax of 
the major conflict (Involvement – tables available upon request). 
 
8. Summary and conclusion 
 
This  study  investigates  whether  founding-family  ownership  is  likely  to  affect  the 
quality of labor relations. Using data from labor conflicts during 2004 in workplaces of listed 
companies, our results clearly demonstrate that a family ownership environment improves the 
quality  of  labor  relations.  More  specifically,  we  find  a  significant  reduction  in  strike 
involvement, strike duration and the likelihood that a workplace experiences a strike as well 
as the number of plant  protected  employee layoffs asked by the management, sanctioned 
employees  and  individual  law  disputes  handled  by  an  employment  tribunal,  the  annual 
number of works council or union delegate meetings in the workplace. Our results are robust 
to different measures of family ownership, control for endogeneity and several subsample 
analyses. We also document the impact of employee ownership and representation on labor   - 23 -
relations  and  find  for  most  dependent  variables  a  significant  and  negative  relationship. 
Overall, our results support the idea that ownership structure is an important determinant of 
labor relations within firms.   - 24 -
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Table 1 - Distribution of workplaces across the most common industries 
Panel  A  reports  the  distribution  of  workplaces  across  the  most  common  industries.  Panel  B  reports  the 
distribution of workplaces across the country of incorporation of the parent company. The initial sample includes 
all workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a listed company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of workplaces across the most common industries 
 
Industry  Observations  % 
     
Extractive and manufacturing industries  429  42.81% 
Electric, gas and water services  16  1.60% 
Construction  54  5.39% 
Wholesale trade, general merchandise and food stores  170  16.97% 
Hotels and restaurants  14  1.40% 
Transportation and communications  42  4.19% 
Financial activities  58  5.79% 
Real estate, rent and business services  187  18.66% 
Health services  9  0.90% 
Collective, social and personal services  23  2.30% 
     
Total  1,002  100% 
 
Panel B: Distribution of workplaces across the country of incorporation of the parent company 
 
Country  Observations  % 
     
Australia  3  0.30% 
Austria  1  0.10% 
Belgium  17  1.70% 
Bermuda  1  0.10% 
Canada  16  1.60% 
Denmark  6  0.60% 
Finland  4  0.40% 
France  605  60.38% 
Germany  43  4.29% 
India  1  0.10% 
Italy  5  0.50% 
Japan  13  1.30% 
Luxembourg  13  1.30% 
Netherlands  30  2.99% 
Norway  2  0.20% 
South Africa  1  0.10% 
Spain  7  0.70% 
Sweden  27  2.69% 
Switzerland  25  2.50% 
United Kingdom  50  4.99% 
United States  132  13.17% 
     
Total  1,002  100% 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions and comparisons of family and non-family characteristics 
This table presents summary statistics on ownership, board, firm-level, workplace-level and conflict variables used in the analyses and tests of differences in means and 
medians between family and non-family firms. Variable definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries 
belonging to a listed company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. dev. 








Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Family Ownership (%)  1,002  10.67  0.00  87.78  0.00  20.84             
Family Firm (1,0)  1,002  0.30  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.46             
Largest Owner (1,0)  1,002  0.27  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.44             
Family Management (1,0)  1,002  0.13  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.33             
5% Ownership (%)  1,002  20.14  11.51  95.56  0.00  23.71  10.29  0.00  24.33  18.00  -8.910***  -9.837*** 
Employee Ownership (%)  1,002  2.24  1.02  30.73  0.00  3.53  1.53  0.40  2.54  1.29  -4.203***  -5.577*** 
Employee Directors (%)  1,002  4.74  0.00  56.00  0.00  11.49  2.92  0.00  5.51  0.00  -3.278***  -4.069*** 
Firm Size  1,000  54,084.80  12,958.30  1,140,000.00  5,569.00  148,000.00  13,090.95  3,143.11  71,570.06  16,474.40  -5.800***  -10.344*** 
Return on Assets  1,000  0.06  0.05  0.38  -0.45  0.06  0.055  0.06  0.061  0.05  -1.343  0.072 
Leverage  1,000  0.25  0.26  0.76  0.00  0.13  0.24  0.26  0.26  0.26  -1.572  -1.459 
Sales Growth (%)  1,000  13.78  4.19  6,755.02  -51.03  214.33  27.66  3.80  7.86  4.42  1.338  -0.772 
Capital Expenditures  994  0.04  0.04  0.20  0.00  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  2.945***  2.616*** 
Market-to-Book  997  1.82  1.52  17.18  -0.22  1.04  1.89  1.62  1.80  1.49  1.299  0.146 
Volatility  1,000  0.06  0.05  0.57  0.01  0.05  0.07  0.053  0.06  0.052  2.072**  4.652*** 
Common Law Origin (1,0)  1,002  0.20  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.40  0.10  0.00  0.25  0.00  -5.500***  -3.774*** 
Best Company (1,0)  1,002  0.45  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.50  0.35  0.00  0.49  0.00  -4.195***  -3.584*** 
Plant Employees  997  759.67  303.00  88,000.00  20.00  3,367.16  497.57  275.00  871.94  320.00  -1.610  -1.982** 
Fixed-Term Workers (%)  987  3.85  1.00  100.00  0.00  9.12  5.28  2.00  3.23  1.00  3.251***  4.259*** 
Temporary Workers (1,0)  1,002  0.62  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.49  0.60  1.00  0.68  1.00  -2.291**  -1.883* 
Executives (1,0)  1,002  0.96  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.21  0.93  1.00  0.97  1.00  -2.999***  -1.060 
Commercials (1,0)  1,002  0.61  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.49  0.62  1.00  0.61  1.00  0.237  0.200 
Technicians (1,0)  1,002  0.92  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.28  0.86  1.00  0.94  1.00  -3.900***  -1.869* 
Employees (1,0)  1,002  0.94  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.24  0.93  1.00  0.95  1.00  -1.192  -0.489 
Workers (1,0)  1,002  0.72  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.45  0.69  1.00  0.73  1.00  -1.560  -1.213 
Workers under 19 (%)  1,002  0.67  0.00  19.15  0.00  1.70  1.06  0.00  0.51  0.00  4.783***  3.156*** 
Workers betw. 20 & 24 (%)  1,002  6.57  4.41  42.86  0.00  6.64  8.84  5.79  5.61  4.10  7.222***  5.776*** 
Workers betw. 25 & 29 (%)  1,002  12.42  11.11  55.56  0.00  7.28  14.42  13.20  11.56  10.26  5.767***  5.676*** 
Workers betw. 30 & 34 (%)  1,002  15.54  14.71  46.15  0.00  7.63  16.49  15.92  15.14  14.29  2.573**  2.995*** 
Workers betw. 35 & 39 (%)  1,002  15.28  15.22  45.08  0.00  6.25  15.31  14.71  15.27  15.35  0.098  -0.085 
Workers betw. 40 & 44 (%)  1,002  14.36  14.10  35.71  0.00  5.25  13.86  13.34  14.57  14.29  -1.977**  -2.038**   - 29 -
Table 2 - Continued 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. dev. 








Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Workers betw. 45 & 49 (%)  1,002  13.40  12.76  50.00  0.00  6.60  12.59  11.82  13.74  12.99  -2.514**  -2.913*** 
Workers betw. 50 & 54 (%)  1,002  13.20  12.32  80.93  0.00  8.39  10.91  9.78  14.18  13.28  -5.717***  -5.646*** 
Workers betw. 55 & 59 (%)  1,002  8.04  6.74  51.88  0.00  6.34  6.09  4.92  8.87  7.66  -6.470***  -6.468*** 
Workers older than 60 (%)  1,002  0.52  0.00  19.72  0.00  1.39  0.43  0.00  0.56  0.00  -1.429  -1.032 
Wage  1,000  14.32  12.47  461.91  5.94  15.50  13.77  10.78  14.55  13.15  -0.728  -6.933*** 
Age  993  3.77  4.00  5.00  1.00  1.07  3.65  4.00  3.82  4.00  -2.308**  -2.195** 
Unemployment Rate (%)  1,002  8.96  8.40  13.10  5.73  1.52  8.71  8.35  9.06  8.40  -3.305***  -3.148*** 
Population  1,002  439,188.70  56,034.00  2,203,817.00  29.00  806,148.30  431,434.10  53,371.00  442,486.90  57,576.00  0.198  0.973 
Union Membership  859  2.01  2.00  4.00  1.00  0.99  1.91  2.00  2.06  2.00  -1.994**  -2.342** 
Aggressive Union (1,0)  1,002  0.44  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.50  0.438  0.00  0.441  0.00  -0.083  -0.071 
Involvement (%)  954  16.83  3.00  100.00  0.00  25.15  12.09  0.00  18.88  5.00  -3.857***  -3.469*** 
Duration  1,002  1.43  0.69  8.29  0.00  1.80  1.52  0.00  1.88  1.10  -4.159**  -3.801*** 
Strike (1,0)  1,002  0.57  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.50  0.49  0.00  0.60  1.00  -3.233***  -2.760*** 
Redundancies (1,0)  996  0.07  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.25  0.03  0.00  0.09  0.00  -3.170***  -1.388 
Working Hours (1,0)  996  0.04  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.18  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.00  -0.164  0.052 
Compensation (1,0)  996  0.14  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.35  0.12  0.00  0.15  0.00  -1.002  -0.605 
Labor Relations (1,0)  996  0.04  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.20  0.040  0.00  0.044  0.00  -0.280  -0.098 
Union Law (1,0)  996  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.175**  0.168 
Working Conditions (1,0)  996  0.03  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.17  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  -0.895  -0.269 
Qualifications (1,0)  996  0.02  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.710  -0.164 
Organization (1,0)  996  0.02  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.571  -0.128 
Compensated (1,0)  995  0.05  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.22  0.054  0.00  0.052  0.00  0.149  0.057 
Protected Employees  952  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.002  0.00  0.003  0.00  -0.968  -0.455 
Sanctioned Employees  881  0.03  0.02  0.33  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.01  2.923***  4.714*** 
Individual Law Disputes  918  0.01  0.00  0.66  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.228  1.827* 
Works Council  810  13.91  13.00  40.00  0.00  4.62  13.70  13.00  14.00  14.00  -0.840  -0.726 
Union Delegates  927  10.83  11.00  98.00  0.00  5.58  10.42  12.00  11.00  11.00  -1.452  1.118   - 30 -
Table 3 - Family ownership and plant employee involvement during the climax of the major conflict 
This table presents results from regressing the percentage of employees involved during the climax of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace (Involvement) on 
various ownership, board, firm-level, plant-level and conflict variables. We estimate this percentage via Tobit regressions. Independent variable definitions and sources are 
provided in the Appendix. The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a listed company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. The table 
presents the coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values in parentheses and then the R² and adjusted R². ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance 
level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables  Involvement (%) 
Family Ownership (%)  -0.0017***  -0.0014**  -0.0015**  -0.0015**  -0.0017***  -0.0017***  -0.0016**          
   (-2.936)  (-2.374)  (-2.374)  (-2.389)  (-2.750)  (-2.630)  (-2.148)          
Family Firm (1,0)                       -0.0888***       
                        (-2.693)       
Largest Owner (1,0)                          -0.0895**    
                           (-2.557)    
Family Management (1,0)                             -0.0859* 
                              (-1.842) 
5% Ownership (%)     0.0017***  0.0017***  0.0016***  0.0015***  0.0011*  0.0015**  0.0013**  0.0012*  0.0016*** 
      (2.915)  (3.004)  (2.914)  (2.760)  (1.952)  (2.345)  (2.145)  (1.911)  (2.664) 
Employee Ownership (%)     -0.0027  -0.0042  -0.0048  -0.0032  -0.0041  -0.0045  -0.0040  -0.0037  -0.0027 
      (-0.628)  (-0.986)  (-1.133)  (-0.837)  (-1.001)  (-1.069)  (-0.939)  (-0.880)  (-0.649) 
Employee Directors (%)     -0.0592  -0.1381  -0.1363  -0.1227  -0.2283**  -0.2953**  -0.2842**  -0.2742**  -0.2877** 
      (-0.531)  (-1.253)  (-1.233)  (-1.120)  (-2.082)  (-2.576)  (-2.481)  (-2.408)  (-2.518) 
Log (Plant Employees)        0.0749***  0.0712***  0.0541***  0.0629***  0.0618***  0.0626***  0.0623***  0.0624*** 
         (6.305)  (5.890)  (4.630)  (5.228)  (5.197)  (5.233)  (5.224)  (5.228) 
Fixed-Term Workers (%)        -0.0012  -0.0011  -0.0009  -0.0017  -0.0018  -0.0019  -0.0018  -0.0020 
         (-0.901)  (-0.817)  (-0.695)  (-1.430)  (-1.445)  (-1.412)  (-1.351)  (-1.522) 
Temporary Workers (1,0)        -0.0181  -0.0157  -0.0180  -0.0159  -0.0148  -0.0177  -0.0183  -0.0144 
         (-0.610)  (-0.529)  (-0.605)  (-0.519)  (-0.484)  (-0.583)  (-0.601)  (-0.469) 
Wage        -0.0064*  -0.0064*  -0.0069**  -0.0097***  -0.0093***  -0.0094***  -0.0092***  -0.0091** 
         (-1.873)  (-1.865)  (-2.023)  (-2.699)  (-2.632)  (-2.656)  (-2.615)  (-2.550) 
Age           0.0055  0.0021  -0.0125  -0.0138  -0.0133  -0.0135  -0.0128 
            (0.394)  (0.153)  (-0.848)  (-0.920)  (-0.892)  (-0.906)  (-0.855) 
Unemployment Rate (%)           0.0092  0.0030  -0.0023  -0.0006  -0.0032  -0.0027  -0.0017 
            (1.068)  (0.357)  (-0.259)  (-0.067)  (-0.364)  (-0.310)  (-0.189) 
Compensated (1,0)              0.2329***  0.2021***  0.2177***  0.2151***  0.2155***  0.2161*** 
               (5.284)  (4.174)  (4.321)  (4.173)  (4.189)  (4.183) 
Union Membership                 0.0666***  0.0660***  0.0684***  0.0677***  0.0670*** 
                  (4.608)  (4.555)  (4.692)  (4.649)  (4.628) 
Log (Firm Size)                    0.0076  0.0079  0.0076  0.0096 
                     (0.895)  (0.983)  (0.943)  (1.218)   - 31 -
Table 3 - Continued 
Variables  Involvement (%) 
Return on Assets                    0.5858**  0.5170*  0.5392*  0.5734** 
                     (2.035)  (1.895)  (1.958)  (2.022) 
Leverage                    0.1323  0.1362  0.1269  0.1620 
                     (1.233)  (1.284)  (1.189)  (1.527) 
Sales Growth (%)                    0.0124***  0.0127***  0.0127***  0.0117*** 
                     (11.296)  (11.452)  (11.425)  (10.727) 
Capital Expenditures                    0.3441  0.3790  0.3698  0.3745 
                     (0.684)  (0.755)  (0.736)  (0.746) 
Market-to-Book                    -0.0098  -0.0095  -0.0098  -0.0090 
                     (-0.496)  (-0.515)  (-0.525)  (-0.468) 
Common Law Origin (1,0)                    -0.0606*  -0.0616*  -0.0605*  -0.0452 
                     (-1.684)  (-1.707)  (-1.675)  (-1.302) 
Workforce Age Structure 
Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Workforce Employment 
Structure Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cause of Dispute Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.1957*  0.1534  -3.5493***  -3.5571***  -3.2352***  -3.5810***  -3.8919***  -3.9078***  -3.9497***  -4.1552*** 
   (1.957)  (1.509)  (-3.189)  (-3.226)  (-3.329)  (-3.092)  (-3.252)  (-3.303)  (-3.309)  (-3.367) 
R²  0.10  0.11  0.15  0.15  0.18  0.20  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22 
Adjusted R²  0.09  0.10  0.12  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
Observations  954  954  912  907  903  790  781  781  781  781 
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Table 4 - Family ownership and duration of the plant major conflict 
This table presents results from regressing the logarithm of the duration in hours of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace (Duration) on various ownership, 
board, firm-level, plant-level and conflict variables. We estimate this ratio via OLS regressions. Independent variable definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. 
The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a listed company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. The table presents the coefficients and 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values in parentheses and then the R² and adjusted R². ***, **, * * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Variables  Duration 
Family Ownership (%)  -0.0063**  -0.0050*  -0.0053*  -0.0054*  -0.0059**  -0.0061**  -0.0083**          
   (-2.519)  (-1.926)  (-1.848)  (-1.884)  (-2.338)  (-2.314)  (-2.478)          
Family Firm (1,0)                       -0.4366***       
                        (-2.746)       
Largest Owner (1,0)                          -0.4705***    
                           (-2.921)    
Family Management (1,0)                             -0.3190* 
                              (-1.786) 
5% Ownership (%)     0.0069***  0.0070***  0.0070***  0.0057**  0.0054*  0.0053*  0.0049  0.0042  0.0068** 
      (2.685)  (2.651)  (2.600)  (2.212)  (1.846)  (1.728)  (1.595)  (1.312)  (2.345) 
Employee Ownership (%)     -0.0017  -0.0051  -0.0064  0.0020  0.0076  0.0028  0.0061  0.0067  0.0122 
      (-0.093)  (-0.271)  (-0.339)  (0.112)  (0.385)  (0.141)  (0.311)  (0.342)  (0.621) 
Employee Directors (%)     -0.4348  -0.5814  -0.5028  -0.3907  -0.5124  -0.8488*  -0.8005  -0.7560  -0.7922 
      (-0.910)  (-1.193)  (-1.020)  (-0.890)  (-1.088)  (-1.677)  (-1.607)  (-1.515)  (-1.553) 
Log (Plant Employees)        0.2844***  0.2651***  0.1709***  0.2017***  0.2152***  0.2194***  0.2204***  0.2117*** 
         (5.178)  (4.794)  (3.190)  (3.469)  (3.553)  (3.641)  (3.651)  (3.495) 
Fixed-Term Workers (%)        0.0024  0.0023  0.0024  0.0037  0.0039  0.0035  0.0041  0.0033 
         (0.371)  (0.366)  (0.381)  (0.617)  (0.630)  (0.567)  (0.662)  (0.524) 
Temporary Workers (1,0)        -0.0201  -0.0001  0.0010  -0.0359  0.0016  -0.0120  -0.0153  0.0011 
         (-0.154)  (-0.001)  (0.008)  (-0.270)  (0.012)  (-0.090)  (-0.114)  (0.008) 
Wage        -0.0026*  -0.0022  -0.0016  -0.0010  -0.0015  -0.0018  -0.0017  -0.0016 
         (-1.686)  (-1.426)  (-1.055)  (-0.783)  (-1.161)  (-1.462)  (-1.390)  (-1.343) 
Age           0.1010*  0.0841  0.0602  0.0555  0.0565  0.0560  0.0590 
            (1.710)  (1.537)  (0.986)  (0.896)  (0.910)  (0.901)  (0.949) 
Unemployment Rate (%)           0.0318  0.0019  -0.0264  -0.0192  -0.0332  -0.0305  -0.0260 
            (0.801)  (0.051)  (-0.646)  (-0.460)  (-0.789)  (-0.730)  (-0.618) 
Compensated (1,0)              0.7027***  0.6883***  0.7805***  0.7704***  0.7722***  0.7676*** 
               (3.157)  (2.895)  (3.123)  (3.114)  (3.103)  (3.059) 
Union Membership                 0.1234*  0.1107*  0.1201*  0.1185*  0.1153* 
                  (1.876)  (1.677)  (1.822)  (1.797)  (1.737) 
Log (Firm Size)                    -0.0119  -0.0061  -0.0098  0.0069 
                     (-0.306)  (-0.171)  (-0.269)  (0.189)   - 33 -
Table 4 – Continued 
Variables  Duration 
Return on Assets                    1.9394*  1.6532  1.7238  1.9134* 
                     (1.703)  (1.485)  (1.552)  (1.720) 
Leverage                    0.6055  0.6265  0.5802  0.7309 
                     (1.203)  (1.240)  (1.155)  (1.444) 
Sales Growth (%)                    0.0422***  0.0430***  0.0436***  0.0384*** 
                     (6.579)  (6.895)  (6.890)  (5.946) 
Capital Expenditures                    -0.5811  -0.5511  -0.5642  -0.7250 
                     (-0.225)  (-0.214)  (-0.219)  (-0.282) 
Market-to-Book                    0.0175  0.0197  0.0193  0.0201 
                     (0.232)  (0.277)  (0.269)  (0.273) 
Common Law Origin (1,0)                    -0.4322***  -0.4356***  -0.4394***  -0.3501** 
                     (-2.761)  (-2.759)  (-2.807)  (-2.339) 
Workforce Age Structure 
Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Workforce Employment 
Structure Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cause of Dispute Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  1.7103***  1.5340***  -7.4751*  -7.7004*  -5.2880  -6.6780  -7.5908*  -7.5832*  -7.6587*  -8.0968* 
   (5.394)  (4.591)  (-1.677)  (-1.729)  (-1.426)  (-1.588)  (-1.705)  (-1.733)  (-1.740)  (-1.809) 
R²  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.10  0.23  0.25  0.26  0.27  0.27  0.26 
Adjusted R²  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.07  0.19  0.21  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.21 
Observations  1,002  1,002  958  950  943  822  813  813  813  813   - 34 -
Table 5 - Probit model predicting the likelihood of a strike 
This table presents results from regressing a binary variable that equals 1 when there was at least a strike in the workplace, and 0 otherwise (Strike) on various ownership, 
board, firm-level, plant-level and conflict variables. We estimate this variable via Probit regressions. Independent variable definitions and sources are provided in the 
Appendix. The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a listed company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. The table presents the 
coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values in parentheses and then the Pseudo R². ***, **, * * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
Variables  Strike (1,0) 
Family Firm (1,0)  -0.2835**       
   (-2.079)       
Largest Owner (1,0)     -0.2901**    
      (-2.041)    
Family Management (1,0)        -0.3761** 
         (-2.186) 
5% Ownership (%)  0.0059**  0.0056**  0.0067*** 
   (2.238)  (2.059)  (2.631) 
Employee Ownership (%)  -0.0272  -0.0268  -0.0230 
   (-1.529)  (-1.507)  (-1.296) 
Employee Directors (%)  -1.0560**  -1.0278**  -1.1290** 
   (-2.321)  (-2.268)  (-2.469) 
Log (Plant Employees)  0.4454***  0.4450***  0.4425*** 
   (8.286)  (8.287)  (8.199) 
Fixed-Term Workers  0.0036  0.0039  0.0035 
   (0.550)  (0.590)  (0.530) 
Temporary Workers (%)  -0.0931  -0.0936  -0.0788 
   (-0.792)  (-0.797)  (-0.671) 
Wage  -0.0295**  -0.0290**  -0.0282** 
   (-2.164)  (-2.144)  (-2.062) 
Age  0.0019  0.0027  0.0062 
   (0.034)  (0.049)  (0.113) 
Unemployment Rate (%)  -0.0227  -0.0208  -0.0191 
   (-0.662)  (-0.606)  (-0.559) 
Union Membership (%)  0.2225***  0.2209***  0.2215*** 
   (3.893)  (3.858)  (3.869) 
Log (Firm Size)  0.0377  0.0369  0.0348 
   (1.142)  (1.103)  (1.027) 
Return on Assets  1.5047  1.5565  1.6912 
   (1.370)  (1.417)  (1.507) 
Leverage  0.5407  0.5152  0.6159 
   (1.246)  (1.190)  (1.416)   - 35 -
Table 5 - Continued 
Sales Growth (%)  0.1616  0.1670  0.1901 
   (0.611)  (0.636)  (0.722) 
Capital Expenditures  -2.2128  -2.1907  -2.2602 
   (-1.014)  (-1.004)  (-1.045) 
Market-to-Book  -0.0040  -0.0051  -0.0029 
   (-0.060)  (-0.077)  (-0.042) 
Common Law Origin (1,0)  -0.2639*  -0.2646*  -0.2248 
   (-1.851)  (-1.857)  (-1.631) 
Workforce Age Structure Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Workforce Employment Structure Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -10.6618***  -10.7361***  -11.2567*** 
   (-2.619)  (-2.624)  (-2.686) 
Pseudo R²  0.23  0.23  0.23 
Observations  818  818  818   - 36 -
Table 6 - Impact of family ownership and management on labor relations: alternative regressions 
This table presents results from regressing the ratio of the number of layoffs of plant protected employees asked by the management (Protected Employees), sanctioned 
employees (Sanctioned Employees) and individual law disputes handled by an employment tribunal (Individual Law Disputes) during the year to the average number of 
employees in the workplace, the annual number of works council (Works Council) and union delegate (Union Delegates) meetings in the workplace. We estimate the 
Protected Employees, Sanctioned Employees and Individual Law Disputes variables via OLS regressions, and Works Council and Union Delegates variables via Poisson 
regressions. Independent variable definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a listed 
company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. The table presents the coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values in parentheses and then 
the R² and adjusted R². ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance. 
Variables  Protected Employees  Sanctioned Employees  Individual Law Disputes  Works Council  Union Delegates 
Family Ownership (%)  -0.00004**     0.0001     -0.0002     -0.0006     -0.0019*    
   (-2.118)     (1.157)     (-1.241)     (-0.734)     (-1.729)    
Family Management (1,0)     -0.0017**     -0.0078*     -0.0111**     -0.0914**     -0.1103** 
      (-2.431)     (-1.829)     (-2.181)     (-2.223)     (-2.091) 
5% Ownership (%)  -0.00003**  -0.00002*  -0.00002  -0.0001  -0.00004  -0.00004  -0.0007  -0.0008  -0.0003  -0.0001 
   (-2.130)  (-1.767)  (-0.296)  (-1.405)  (-0.037)  (0.044)  (-1.258)  (-1.637)  (-0.424)  (-0.206) 
Employee Ownership (%)  -0.0002***  -0.0002**  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0009**  -0.0007*  -0.0077**  -0.0072**  -0.0120***  -0.0098** 
   (-2.857)  (-2.469)  (-0.281)  (-0.497)  (-1.969)  (-1.865)  (-2.049)  (-2.015)  (-2.708)  (-2.321) 
Employee Directors (1,0)  0.0018  0.0020  0.0064  0.0021  -0.0051  -0.0055  -0.0800  -0.0949  -0.1220  -0.1158 
   (0.657)  (0.741)  (0.490)  (0.165)  (-0.365)  (-0.381)  (-0.832)  (-0.972)  (-0.864)  (-0.826) 
Log (Plant Employees)  -0.0008***  -0.0008***  -0.0065***  -0.0061***  -0.0038**  -0.0038**  0.1074***  0.1091***  0.1483***  0.1487*** 
   (-2.921)  (-2.909)  (-3.829)  (-3.654)  (-2.426)  (-2.489)  (7.355)  (7.508)  (4.069)  (4.091) 
Fixed-Term Workers (%)  -0.00003  -0.00004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0004 
   (-1.461)  (-1.634)  (0.551)  (0.708)  (1.142)  (1.111)  (0.142)  (0.151)  (-0.154)  (-0.204) 
Temporary Workers (1,0)  -0.0006  -0.0006  0.0038  0.0042  -0.0019  -0.0017  0.0006  0.0026  -0.0160  -0.0152 
   (-0.854)  (-0.833)  (0.967)  (1.070)  (-0.414)  (-0.372)  (0.023)  (0.097)  (-0.338)  (-0.326) 
Wage  0.00001  0.00001  -0.0001**  -0.0001**  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0033***  -0.0032***  -0.0008  -0.0003 
   (0.592)  (0.550)  (-2.559)  (-2.151)  (1.331)  (1.365)  (-5.583)  (-5.521)  (-0.196)  (-0.085) 
Age  -0.0001  -0.00003  0.0001  0.0001  0.0005  0.0006  -0.0138  -0.0137  0.0199  0.0209 
   (-0.154)  (-0.102)  (0.065)  (0.098)  (0.293)  (0.371)  (-1.372)  (-1.353)  (1.303)  (1.369) 
Unemployment Rate (%)  -0.00004  -0.0001  0.0018*  0.0018*  -0.0010  -0.0012  -0.0066  -0.0079  -0.0069  -0.0091 
   (-0.246)  (-0.420)  (1.686)  (1.646)  (-1.155)  (-1.309)  (-0.850)  (-1.018)  (-0.501)  (-0.661) 
Union Membership  0.0004  0.0005  -0.0029**  -0.0028*  0.0029  0.0030  0.0320***  0.0330***  -0.0110  -0.0097 
   (1.471)  (1.500)  (-1.978)  (-1.926)  (1.495)  (1.533)  (2.597)  (2.667)  (-0.741)  (-0.643) 
Log (Firm Size)  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0012  -0.0013  -0.0013  0.0120  0.0089  -0.0199  -0.0185 
   (-0.520)  (-0.244)  (-0.070)  (-1.020)  (-1.223)  (-1.361)  (1.524)  (1.183)  (-1.246)  (-1.230) 
Return on Assets  -0.0261*  -0.0263*  -0.0029  -0.0013  -0.1067  -0.1079  -0.4850**  -0.4668**  -0.4531*  -0.4596* 
   (-1.695)  (-1.691)  (-0.103)  (-0.048)  (-0.736)  (-0.742)  (-2.555)  (-2.439)  (-1.713)  (-1.743) 
Leverage  -0.0054**  -0.0050**  0.0028  0.0007  -0.0017  0.0004  -0.0634  -0.0515  0.3052*  0.3302* 
   (-2.100)  (-1.972)  (0.199)  (0.053)  (-0.090)  (0.025)  (-0.582)  (-0.478)  (1.828)  (1.942)   - 37 -
Table 6 - Continued 
Variables  Protected Employees  Sanctioned Employees  Individual Law Disputes  Works Council  Union Delegates 
Sales Growth (%)  0.0005***  0.0005***  -0.0004***  -0.0004***  0.0003  0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0008  0.0034**  0.0024** 
   (6.302)  (6.181)  (-3.023)  (-3.048)  (0.526)  (0.410)  (-0.597)  (-1.079)  (2.526)  (2.123) 
Capital Expenditures  -0.0154  -0.0154  0.0577  0.0564  0.0613  0.0588  -0.5186  -0.5052  -0.7180  -0.6841 
   (-1.532)  (-1.538)  (1.025)  (1.006)  (0.973)  (0.946)  (-1.157)  (-1.147)  (-0.754)  (-0.732) 
Market-to-Book  0.0006  0.0006  -0.0015  -0.0015  0.0017  0.0018  -0.0009  0.0001  0.0020  0.0031 
   (1.573)  (1.575)  (-1.002)  (-0.963)  (0.496)  (0.518)  (-0.112)  (0.012)  (0.161)  (0.262) 
Common Law Origin (1,0)  -0.0005  -0.0001  0.0051  0.0029  -0.0012  -0.0002  0.0044  0.0052  0.0354  0.0537 
   (-0.644)  (-0.164)  (1.081)  (0.634)  (-0.257)  (-0.033)  (0.137)  (0.164)  (0.843)  (1.229) 
Workforce Age Structure 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Workforce Employment 
Structure Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.0289  0.0264  -0.0114  -0.0029  0.0370  0.0276  0.3491  0.2661  -1.9821  -2.2502 
   (1.352)  (1.262)  (-0.102)  (-0.026)  (0.307)  (0.238)  (0.346)  (0.254)  (-0.938)  (-1.093) 
R²  0.12  0.12  0.27  0.27  0.05  0.05  0.21  0.22  0.19  0.19 
Adjusted R²  0.07  0.07  0.22  0.23  0.01  0.01  0.16  0.16  0.14  0.14 
Observations  790  790  741  741  759  759  664  664  765  765 
   - 38 -
Table 7 - Determinants of family ownership 
This table reports results from regressing the percentage of family ownership (Family Ownership) on various ownership, 
board, firm-level, plant-level and conflict variables. We estimate this percentage via Tobit regressions. Independent variable 
definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a 
listed company with an ultimate ownership of more than 95%. The table presents the coefficients and Heteroskedasticity-
consistent (White, 1980) t-values in parentheses and then the R² and adjusted R². ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance 









Log (Firm Size)  -0.1344*** 
   (-14.657) 
Return on Assets  -0.0630 
   (-0.225) 
Leverage  -0.0905 
   (-0.649) 
Sales Growth (%)  0.0079*** 
   (5.785) 
Capital Expenditures  0.8635 
   (1.465) 
Market-to-Book  -0.0016 
   (-0.119) 
Volatility  -1.3768*** 
   (-2.872) 
Common Law Origin (1,0)  -0.3410*** 
   (-6.758) 
Industry Dummies  Yes 
Constant  1.9548*** 
   (9.342) 
R²  0.33 
Adjusted R²  0.32 
Observations  989   - 39 -
Table 8 - Conflict involvement and duration controlling for endogeneity 
This table reports the second stage of a 2SLS regression, using the regressions reported in Table 7 as the first stage. The second 
stage uses the predicted value from the first stage to instrument the endogeneous choice variables. The dependent variables are 
the percentage of employees involved during the climax of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace (Involvement) 
and the logarithm of the duration in hours of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace (Duration). Independent 
variable definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. The initial sample includes all workplaces of subsidiaries 
belonging  to  a  listed  company  with  an  ultimate  ownership  of  more  than  95%.  The  table  presents  the  coefficients  and 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent  (White,  1980)  t-values  and  then  the  R²  and  adjusted  R².  ***,  **,  *  indicate  coefficients 
significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables  Involvement (%)  Duration 
Predicted Value of Family Ownership  -0.0016**  -0.0083** 
   (-2.141)  (-2.481) 
5% Ownership  0.0015**  0.0052* 
   (2.372)  (1.688) 
Employee Ownership (%)  -0.0045  0.0027 
   (-1.069)  (0.136) 
Employee Directors (%)  -0.2966***  -0.8438* 
   (-2.585)  (-1.666) 
Log (Plant Employees)  0.0618***  0.2150*** 
   (5.197)  (3.551) 
Fixed-Term Workers (%)  -0.0018  0.0039 
   (-1.443)  (0.627) 
Temporary Workers (1,0)  -0.0155  0.0045 
   (-0.508)  (0.034) 
Wage  -0.0093***  -0.0015 
   (-2.629)  (-1.163) 
Age  -0.0138  0.0557 
   (-0.923)  (0.900) 
Unemployment Rate (%)  -0.0008  -0.0182 
   (-0.092)  (-0.436) 
Compensated (1,0)  0.2179***  0.7799*** 
   (4.322)  (3.118) 
Union Membership  0.0660***  0.1109* 
   (4.554)  (1.680) 
Log (Firm Size)  0.0076  -0.0123 
   (0.890)  (-0.315) 
Return on Assets  0.5917**  1.9171* 
   (2.052)  (1.682) 
Leverage  0.1371  0.5841 
   (1.266)  (1.152) 
Sales Growth (%)  0.0124***  0.0423*** 
   (11.262)  (6.599) 
Capital Expenditures  0.3332  -0.5329 
   (0.662)  (-0.206) 
Market-to-Book  -0.0096  0.0168 
   (-0.488)  (0.223) 
Common Law Origin (1,0)  -0.0608*  -0.4327*** 
   (-1.687)  (-2.763) 
Workforce Age Structure Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Workforce Employment Structure Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Cause of Dispute Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -3.9242***  -7.4835* 
   (-3.257)  (-1.680) 
R²  0.22  0.26 
Adjusted R²  0.17  0.22 
Observations  780  812   - 40 -
Table 9 - Robustness tests 
Panel A presents results  for different definitions of a family  firm and for several sample restrictions the coefficient of a  family firm  variable in  multivariate regressions  of 
Involvement and Duration. Panel B presents coefficients on dummy variables that equal one when the firm is a family firm in the generation in each column heading, and zero 
otherwise in multivariate regressions of Involvement and Duration. The dependent variables are the percentage of employees involved during the climax of the major conflict which 
occurred in the workplace (Involvement) and the logarithm of the duration in hours of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace (Duration). We estimate Involvement via 
Tobit regressions and Duration via OLS regressions. Independent variables are the same as those of tables 4 and 5 and definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. The 
initial sample  includes all  workplaces of subsidiaries belonging to a listed company  with an ultimate ownership  of  more than 95%. The  table presents the coefficients and 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². ***, **, * indicate coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Subsample analyses and alternative definitions of a family firm 
 
Variables  Involvement (%)  R²  Adj. R²  Observations  Duration  R²  Adj. R²  Observations 
Family Ownership (%) after excluding all non French firms  -0.0016* 
(-1.681*)  0.27  0.19  462  -0.0071* 
(-1.702)  0.27  0.19  484 
Family Ownership (%) after excluding all French firms  -0.0013 
(-0.887)  0.28  0.15  319  -0.0065 
(-0.939)  0.34  0.22  329 
Family Ownership (%) after excluding financial firms.  -0.0017** 
(-2.174)  0.22  0.17  738  -0.0086** 
(-2.547)  0.26  0.21  768 
Family Ownership (%) after capping the dependent variables at the 99
th percentile.  -0.0017** 
(-2.266)  0.23  0.18  776  -0.0063** 
(-1.977)  0.28  0.23  807 
Family Ownership (%) after excluding all workplaces without a strike during the year.  -0.0023*** 
(-3.305)  0.22  0.12  458  -0.0147*** 
(-2.887)  0.15  0.04  445 
Family Ownership (%) defined as the fraction of shares of all classes held by the founding family with at least a 
10% equity stake. 
-0.0016** 
(-2.067)  0.22  0.17  781  -0.0080** 
(-2.443)  0.26  0.22  813 
Family Ownership (%) defined as the fraction of shares of all classes held by the founding family with at least a 
20% equity stake. 
-0.0013* 
(-1.809)  0.22  0.17  781  -0.0074** 
(-2.319)  0.26  0.22  813 
Family Ownership (%) when the founding family is the largest shareholder of the firm and has at least 10% of 
the shares. 
-0.0016** 
(-2.071)  0.22  0.17  781  -0.0081** 
(-2.460)  0.26  0.22  813 
Family Ownership (%) when the founding family is the largest shareholder of the firm and has at least 20% of 
the shares. 
-0.0013* 
(-1.823)  0.22  0.17  781  -0.0075** 
(-2.341)  0.26  0.22  813 
Family Votes (%) defined as the fraction of votes held by the founding family with at least a 5% stake.  -0.0012* 
(-1.844)  0.21  0.15  725  -0.0086* 
(-2.814)  0.27  0.21  755 
Family Ownership (%) after excluding firms with decreases in the number of employees greater than 20% 
between 2003 and 2004 and firms with a drop in net property, plant and equipment greater than 15% over the 
same period. 
-0.0016** 
(-2.010)  0.25  0.19  711  -0.0081** 
(-2.242)  0.27  0.22  741 
Family Ownership (%) after excluding firms with decreases in the number of employees greater than 20% 
between 2003 and 2004, firms with a drop in net property, plant and equipment greater than 15% over the same 
period and firms with negative Return on Assets. 
-0.0020** 
(-2.356)  0.27  0.21  669  -0.0087** 
(-2.277)  0.27  0.21  696 
 
Panel B: Effects of family firm generations on labor relations 
 
Variables  First generation  Other generations  R²  Adj. R²  Observations 
Involvement (%)  -0.0286 
(-0.623) 
-0.1249*** 
(-3.290)  0.22  0.17  781 
Duration  -0.2714 
(-1.366) 
-0.5378*** 
(-3.033)  0.27  0.22  813 
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Appendix - Description of all the variables used in the analyses 
This table explains the construction of the ownership, board, firm-level, workplace-level and conflict variables used in the 
analyses. 
 
Ownership and board variables 
Family Ownership 
(%) 
Fraction of shares of all classes held by the founding family with at least a 5% equity stake. As 
in Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), a founder is an individual 
responsible for the firm's early growth and development. Sources: Registration documents for 
founding-family  equity  stakes,  Registration  documents,  Factiva,  LexisNexis  and  the 
“International Directory of Company Histories” resource for the identification of founders. 
Family Firm (1,0)  Binary variable that equals 1 when the founding family holds at least a 5% equity stake, and 0 
otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
Largest Owner 
(%) 
Binary variable that equals 1 when the founding family is the largest shareholder in the firm, 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
Family 
Management (1,0) 
Binary variable that equals 1 when any member of the founding family holds the title of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), and 0 otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
5% Ownership 
(%) 
Fraction of shares of all classes held by all the non-family shareholders who hold at least a 5% 
equity stake. Source: Registration documents. 
Employee 
Ownership (%) 
Fraction of shares of all classes held by the employees. Source: Registration documents. 
Employee 
Directors (%) 
Fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. Source: Registration 
documents. 
   
Firm-level variables 
Firm Size  Book value of total assets, euro millions. Source: Worldscope. 
Return on Assets  Return on Assets measured as operating income over total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
Leverage  Leverage measured as total debt over total assets. Source: Worldscope. 




Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
Market-to-Book  Market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus 
the  book  value  of  total  liabilities,  all  divided  by  the  book  value  of  total  assets.  Source: 
Worldscope. 
Volatility  Monthly stock return volatility over the last twelve months. Source: Worldscope. 
Common Law 
Origin (1,0) 
Binary variable that equals 1 when the origin of the commercial law of a country is English 




Binary variable equals to 1 when the firm is in the list of one of the 2004 “Best companies to 
work for” classifications by the Financial Times (“The World's Most Respected Companies”), 
Great Place to Work For Institute, Journal du Net or TNS Sofres, and 0 otherwise. 
   
Workplace-level variables 




Fraction of fixed-term workers in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Temporary 
Workers (1,0) 
Binary variable that equals 1 when temporary workers are employed in the workplace, and 0 
otherwise. Source: Dares.  
Executives (1,0)  Binary variable that equals 1 when executives are employed in the workplace, and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Dares. 
Commercials (1,0)  Binary  variable  that  equals  1  when  commercials  are  employed  in  the  workplace,  and  0 
otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Technicians (1,0)  Binary  variable  that  equals  1  when  technicians  are  employed  in  the  workplace,  and  0 
otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Employees (1,0)  Binary  variable  that  equals  1  when  employees  are  employed  in  the  workplace,  and  0 
otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Workers (1,0)  Binary variable that equals 1 when blue-collar workers are employed in the workplace, and 0 
otherwise. Source: Dares.   - 42 -
Appendix - Continued 
Workers under 19 
(%), Workers 
betw. 20 & 24 
(%), …, Workers 
older than 60 (%) 
Denote respectively fractions of workers under 19, between 20 and 24, 25 and 29, 30 and 34, 
35 and 39, 40 and 44, 45 and 49, 50 and 54, 55 and 59, and older than 60. Source: Dares. 
Wage  Net average hourly full-time-equivalent compensation in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Age  Continuous variable that equals 1 when plant age < 5 years, 2 when 5 years ≤ plant age ≤ 9 
years, 3 when 10 years ≤ plant age ≤ 19 years, 4 when 20 years ≤ plant age ≤ 49 years, 5 when 
plant age ≥ 50 years. Source: Dares. 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Unemployment  rate  in  the  area  where  the  workplace  is  located.  Source:  Insee  (Institut 
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques - National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies, www.insee.fr). 
Population  Number  of  inhabitants  in  the  city  where  the  workplace  is  located.  Source:  Insee  (Institut 
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques - National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies, www.insee.fr). 
Union 
Membership 
Continuous variable that equals 1 when the fraction of workers in the plant who belong to a 
union < 5%, 2 when 5% ≤ fraction < 10%, 3 when 10% ≤ fraction < 20%, and 4 when fraction 
≥ 20%. Source: Dares. 
Aggressive Union 
(1,0) 
Binary  variable  that  equals  1  when  the  most  representative  confederation  at  the  latest 
employee representatives election was affiliated to one for which the 1906 Charter of Amiens 
is still the founding document, and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Industry variables  Binary variables for each different industry in the sample. Source: Dares. 
   
Conflict variables 
Involvement (%)  Percent of the employees involved during the climax of the major conflict which occurred in 
the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Duration  Logarithm of the duration in hours of the major conflict which occurred in the workplace. 
Source: Dares. 
Strike (1,0)  Binary  variable  that  equals  1  when  there  was  at  least  a  conflict  in  the  workplace,  and  0 
otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Redundancies 
(1,0) 
Binary variable that equals 1 when the major conflict is due to redundancies in the workplace, 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Working Hours 
(1,0) 
Binary  variable  that  equals  1  when  the  major  conflict  is  due  to  working  hours  in  the 
workplace, and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Compensation 
(1,0) 




Binary variable that equals 1 when the major conflict is due to difficult labor relations in the 
workplace (ragging, discipline…), and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 




Binary variable that equals 1 when the major conflict is due to working conditions in the 
workplace, and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Qualifications 
(1,0) 
Binary variable that equals 1 when the major conflict is due to qualification difficulties in the 
workplace, and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Organization (1,0)  Binary variable that equals 1 when the major conflict is due to a technical or an organizational 
change in the workplace, and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Compensated (1,0)  Binary variable that equals 1 when the strikers received full or part compensation during their 
days of strike, and 0 otherwise. Source: Dares. 
Protected 
Employee Layoffs 
Ratio of the number of layoffs of plant protected employees asked by the management during 
the year to the average number of employees in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Sanctioned 
Employees 
Ratio of the number of plant sanctioned employees during the year to the average number of 
employees in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Individual Law 
Disputes 
Ratio of the number of individual law disputes handled by an employment tribunal during the 
year to the average number of employees in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Works Council 
Meetings 
Annual number of works council meetings in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
Union Delegate 
Meetings 
Annual number of union delegate meetings in the workplace. Source: Dares. 
 